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THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS IN
WYOMING: AN OVERVIEW
Mark W. Gifford*
In an article written more than thirty years ago, Professor
Kuntz commented upon the future development of oil and
gas law in Wyoming:
It should be possible to do what the Wyoming
Supreme Court has already exhibited a tendency
to do, and that is to adopt no ready-made, comprehensive accumulation of decisions from another
state, but to accept only those parts which will
round out a body of law containing certain basic
concepts for purposes of stability, yet having sufficient flexibility to meet the demands of practical
consideration as technology and business methods
in the field progress, and from which problems as
yet unforeseen may be treated with a minimum of
difficulty and contradiction.'
To a large extent, that statement stands today as an accurate characterization of the development of oil and gas law
in the state. As the following pages reveal, the involvement
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of both the courts and the legislature of Wyoming in shaping
the law has been minimal, dealing with specific problems
as they arise and tailoring the solutions to fit practical
needs. A few minor inconsistencies have been noted, but
none of real consequence.
The writer's objective in this article is exactly what
the title implies: to provide an overview of the law of oil
and gas in Wyoming. It does not purport to be an exhaustive
treatment of all the facets of the law in the state. It is
rather an effort to identify the principles adopted by lawmakers to deal with a variety of problems in the context of
oil and gas. For ease of organization, the article is divided
into three sections. The first concentrates on the nature of
interests in oil and gas, including ownership theory and
the consequences of the classification of interests in those
resources. The second section deals with the legal protection
extended to an owner of interests in oil and gas. The final
section relates the fairly recent development of efforts to
conserve the resources of Wyoming through well spacing,
pooling and unitization.
I. THE NATURE OF INTERESTS IN OIL AND GAS

The Supreme Court of Wyoming has experienced some
difficulty in answering several fundamental questions regarding the character of interests in oil and gas: What is
the nature of the landowner's interest in the minerals in
and under his land? How can interests in oil and gas be
characterized, within the context of real property law? What
are the consequences of those characterizations? The court's
efforts to deal with those issues have resulted in decisions
which are sometimes vague as to the theory applied.
That observation should not be interpreted as critical
of the Wyoming court. If there is anything common to the
law of the various oil- and gas-producing states, it is the
general confusion as to the nature of interests in those
resources. Also, since so few cases have turned upon the
question of which theory applies in Wyoming, the practical
effects of the court's vagueness have not been significant.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/3
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A. The Nature of Ownership in Oil and Gas
Several theories have developed as to the nature of
ownership in oil and gas, among them nonownership theory,
qualified ownership theory, ownership in place theory, and
ownership of strata theory. Simply stated nonownership
theory holds that no person owns oil and gas until it is
produced.2 That doctrine is essentially an extension of the
"rule of capture" and stems from the view that oil and gas
is migratory in nature. Under qualified ownership theory,
owners of land lying over a common reservoir each have
certain correlative rights (and duties) in connection with
the oil and gas below.' The rule most often applied to
interests in oil and gas is ownership in place theory, which
holds that the nature of the landowner's interest in those
substances is the same as his interest in solid minerals
contained in his land.4 Finally, decisions from a few jurisdictions have held that the landowner owns the sedimentary
layer containing the oil and gas within the limits of the
vertical planes which bound his land, the so-called ownership of strata theory.'
It is difficult to determine which of those theories
applies in Wyoming. In the early case of State v. Snyder,
the Supreme Court of Wyoming quoted approvingly from
an Illinois decision holding that "(o) wing to its fugitive
nature, a grant of the oil under the ground is a grant, not
of the oil in place in the earth, but of such oil as the
grantee may find there and save;" obviously, language of
nonownership theory.' In State ex rel. Cross v. Board of
Land Con'rs., the same court quoted from Thompson on
Real Property that "[s]ince minerals in place are part of
the land, the owner of the fee in the land has the absolute
right of property in the mines and quarries beneath the
surface .... ." Similar language of ownership in place theory
1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203.1 (1981).
Id. § 203.2.
Id. § 203.3.
Id. § 203.4.
29 Wyo. 163, 191, 212 P. 758, 763-64 (1923) (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v.
Daughetee, 240 Il. 361, 88 N.E. 818, 826 (1909)).
7. 50 Wyo. 181, 202, 58 P.2d 423, 480 (1936) (quoting 1 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY § 87).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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can be found in the later cases of Denver Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Dixon, where the court stated that the direct interest
in the oil in place had been reserved,' and Picardv. Richards,
where it was held that a conveyance or reservation of a
mineral interest gave title to the oil in place.9 In the lastnamed case, the court cited cases from ownership in place,
nonownership and qualified ownership theory states.
At least one writer has concluded that Wyoming adheres to ownership in place theory. ° Professors Williams
and Meyers disagree, pointing out that "the classification
of leasehold interests as profits a pendre (see discussion
below) is some evidence that the ownership in place theory
is not adopted." The professors categorize Wyoming as a
nonownership theory state."
Ultimately, the determination of whether nonownership
theory or ownership in place theory applies to interests in
oil and gas in Wyoming is of small consequence. In their
treatise, Professors Williams and Meyers end their discussion of the legal consequences of the various theories as to
the nature of the landowner's interest with the following
remarks:
[T]he theory held by the state is of little importance apart from its influence on the classification
of mineral, royalty and leasehold interests as corporeal or incorporeal ... The fact that little if any
discussion is found in cases from states recently
arriving on the oil and gas scene is evidence of the
insignificance of the theory to the adjudication of
controversies. Further evidence is found in the infrequency of discussion of the matter in opinions in
any state and the difficulty observed in ascertaining the theory held in certain states by reason of
inconsistencies in the opinions from such states. 2
B. Classification of Interests in Oil and Gas
It has long been recognized in most jurisdictions that
the landowner may create three types of interests in oil
8. 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842 (1942).
9. 366 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1961).
10. Note, Classifications,in Wyoming, of Interest in Oil and Gas for Various
Purposes and Their Consequences, 17 WYO. L.J. 80, 82 (1962).
11. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 2, § 203.1.
12. Id. § 204.9.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/3
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and gas-leasehold interests, mineral interests, and royalty
interests. 3 In the case of Boatman v. Andre, 4 the Supreme
Court of Wyoming recognized the oil and gas lease as a
right granted by the holder of the mineral estate giving
one lessee the authority to search for oil and gas and to
remove either if found. Prior to 1961, none of the decisions
of the court distinguished between a mineral interest 5 and
a royalty interest."6 The terms were used interchangeably,
leading one writer to characterize the two terms as synon5 the court recymous." Finally, in Picard v. Richards,"
ognized that "There may be an estate interest in minerals,
larger than a royalty interest, which ... is called a 'mineral
estate', at times stated as a 'mineral interest'. It is an estate
in fee simple in and to the minerals." 9
1. The Corporeal-Incorporeal Distinction
The leading case in Wyoming concerning the corporealincorporeal distinction is Boatmen v. Andre.2" In that case,
the supreme court faced the question of whether the estate
granted by an oil and gas lease could be lost by abandonment.21 The court observed that while title to land cannot
be lost by abandonment, the right created by an oil and gas
lease is in the nature of a profit a prendre and therefore
an incorporeal hereditament, which may be abandoned. The
13. Id. § 202.
14. 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370 (1932).
15. "The owner of the full mineral interest in particular premises normally
has the right to go upon the premises for the purpose of prospecting for,
severing and removing therefrom all minerals . . . A severed mineral
interest normally includes development and executive rights, i.e., the right
to drill or to execute an oil and gas lease." 1 H. WILLIAS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 2, § 202.2.
16. "[A royalty interest] differs from a mineral interest in that the owner is
not authorized to go upon the premises in which the royalty interest exists
for the purpose of prospecting for, severing and removing minerals ...
The owner is, however, entitled to share in such minerals as are severed,
or the proceeds thereof." Id. § 202.3.
17. Note, Oil and Gas Royalty Synonymous with Mineral Interest, 1 Wyo. L.J.
92 (1947).
18. 366 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1961).
19. Id. at 123.
20. Supra note 14.
21. The question of abandonment of an oil and gas lease had reached the
Supreme Court of Wyoming once before in the case of Phillips et. al. v.
Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41, 95 P. 846 (1908). In that case, the court did not
decree a forfeiture of the lease, nor did it discuss the corporeal-incorporeal
distinction.
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court concluded that the leases involved in that case had
been abandoned.
Professors Williams and Meyers list a number of possible consequences of the classification of an interest in oil
and gas as incorporeal, including the possibility of abandonment." The professors go on to conclude that in terms of
practical effect, the corporeal-incorporeal distinction has
"little importance." 3 That conclusion is supported by the
fact that since Boatman v. Andre, no reported Wyoming
cases have held an interest in oil and gas to have been extinguished by abandonment.
2. The Realty-Personalty Distinction
Before tracing the development of Wyoming oil and
gas law with respect to the realty-personalty distinction, it
should be noted that the classification of an interest in oil
and gas as realty or as personalty is unrelated to the
corporeal-incorporeal distinction. The two questions are
"separate and distinct" from one another: "(t)he former
classification is made on4 the basis of duration, the latter
on its possessory nature.M

The question of whether an interest in oil and gas is
realty or personalty was broached in the case of State v.
Snyder." That case involved a constitutional provision that
all proceeds from the sale or lease of school lands belong to
the corpus of the school fund.26 The Supreme Court of
Wyoming held that proceeds from a royalty interest in
school lands should be included in the permanent school
fund, as oil and gas, while in situ, are a part of the realty.
The question arose in a different context in Denver
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon.2 The plaintiff in that
action had foreclosed under a mortgage containing general
words of conveyance without reservation. The defendant,
1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERs,
pr a note 2, § 210.
Id. § 211.
Id. § 212.
29 Wyo. 163, 212 P. 758 (1923).
26. WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 2.
27. Supra note 8.
22.
23.
24.
25.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/3
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a grantee of a royalty interest under an assignment made
subsequent to the mortgage, contended that an interest in
oil and gas is personalty and does not pass under general
words of conveyance. The supreme court observed that the
royalty interest "may be said, under our terminology dividing property into real and personal, to be one of a dual
nature. It is not, then, perhaps surprising that some of the
courts have, under particular circumstances, considered the
right as personal property. Historically considered, the view
is favored, we think, that it is an interest in real property
.... "28 The court further noted that "by the great weight
of authority, especially as clarified by the decisions in the
last decade, a royalty interest, at least if of a permanent
nature, has been held to be real and not personal property
. 29 The supreme court ultimately upheld the lower
court's determination that the royalty interest was realty,
and therefore passed to the plaintiff under the general words
of conveyance.
The Wyoming court was next asked to decide the proper
classification of a lesser interest in oil and gas. Torgeson v.
Connelly involved an operating agreement with a primary
term of twenty years and "so long thereafter as oil, gas,
and other hydrocarbon substances are produced in commercial quantities."" ° The agreement purported to grant the
exclusive right to drill on the land in accordance with a
federal lease. The court was of the opinion that "(a)lthough
this is less than the royalty interest previously considered
by us and less even than an oil and gas lease, it in effect
conveys a portion of the lease or the rights thereunder and
constitutes real property.""1 After the Torgeson case it
appears settled that oil and gas interests, at least those of
potentially infinite duration, are real property in Wyoming.2
The realty-personalty distinction has been consequential
in four main areas of Wyoming oil and gas law. The first
28. Id. at 845.

29. Id. at 848.

30. 348 P.2d 63, 69 (Wyo. 1959).
31. Id.
32. Indeed, eight years prior to Torgeson, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
cited Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon in support of the unqualified
statement that "[o]il and gas interests in land are real property." Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919, 926 (1951).
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and most obvious consequence of their classification as real
property is that operating agreements, oil and gas leases,
royalty interests, and mineral interests all fall within the
statute of frauds. 3 Second, those interests are recordable
interests within the purview of the Wyoming recording
statutes, and as such must be recorded in order to be protected against a later purchaser in good faith and for value. 4
A third consequence of the realty-personalty distinction is
illustrated by Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon, 5
where the point in controversy was whether an interest in
oil and gas passed by a mortgage of "real estate". As previously noted, there the Supreme Court of Wyoming based
its holding that the royalty interest passed with the mortgage on its determination that such an interest is realty.
Professors Williams and Meyers are critical of that approach; it is their view that "the classification of the royalty
interest as realty or as personalty is properly of no significance in this context; the question is simply whether the
royalty interest... is viewed as appurtenant to the land.""6
The final area in which the realty-personalty distinction has had significance is taxation. The early case of
Miller v. Buck Creek Oil Co., 7 dealing with the relative
obligations of the lessor and lessee to pay the gross products
tax on oil and gas production, contained dictum to the effect
that the tax was on property and was not a license, privilege
or occupation tax. That case was later cited by the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming as evidence that the Supreme Court of Wyoming "leans toward
the doctrine . . . that mineral when severed from the land
becomes personal property and is taxable as such."' Any
doubts were laid to rest in the case of Oregon Basin Oil &
33. See, e.g., Montana & Western Oil Co. v. Gibson, 19 Wyo. 1, 113 P. 784
(1911); Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 69 Wyo. 154, 238 P.2d 919 (1951);
Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co. v. Ohio Oil Co., 70 Wyo. 263, 248 P.2d 198
(1952).
34. See, e.g., Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dixon, supra note 8; Dame v.
Mileski, 80 Wyo. 156, 340 P.2d 205 (1959); Note, Recording Federal Oil
and Gas Leases, 15 Wyo. L.J. 237 (1961).
35. Supra note 8.
36. 1 H. WILLAms & C. MEYERs, supra note 2, § 213.8.
37. 38 Wyo. 505, 269 P. 43 (1928).
38. First Natl Bank of Chicago v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 3 F. Supp. 433,
436 (D. Wyo. 1933).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/3
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Gas Co. v. Ohio Oil Co."9 That action involved an oil and
gas lease with a provision that the lessee was to pay all taxes
assessed on the leased lands. When production was obtained,
the lessee deducted from the account with the lessor a proportionate amount of the gross products tax levied on production. The lessor sued to recover that deduction, maintaining that the gross products tax was a tax upon realty, and
therefore properly payable by the lessee under the express
terms of the lease. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected
that position, holding that the gross products tax is a tax
upon personalty.
II.

THE PROTECTION OF INTERESTS IN OIL AND GAS

Having discussed the nature of ownership of oil and
gas in Wyoming, and the various classifications of interests
in those resources (and the consequences of such classifications), this writer will next trace the development of the
law in protecting those interests in a variety of contexts.
Perhaps no opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court in
the field of oil and gas has engendered more controversy
than its holding in the case of Martel v. Hall Oil Co.4" That
case concerned the liability of a trespasser to the owner of
an interest in oil and gas for destruction of the speculative
value of the interest. Martel, an oil and gas lessee, brought
suit against a trespasser who had drilled a dry hole on the
leased lands, thereby rendering the lease valueless. The
supreme court acknowledged that a right had been violated,
and the injured plaintiff was entitled to recovery of damages
as shown. Martel claimed damages for the value of the
interest as a speculation. In the now (in)famous language
of that opinion, the court denied recovery of all but nominal
damages,4 stating:
It may be, though there is no showing to that effect,
that plaintiffs might have sold their rights for a
considerable sum of money. They would then have
39. 70 Wyo. 263, 248 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1952).
40. 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862 (1927).
41.

In an action arising out of the same trespass, Martel's lessor recovered
for both surface damages and punitive damages. Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin,
33 Wyo. 92, 237 P. 255 (1925).
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been the gainers and the purchaser would have been
the loser. They would, upon their own theory, have
pocketed a lot of money, but for what? What would
they have given in return? Nothing. They would
have sold something of no value whatever ...

That

a wealthy corporation might have been the purchaser furnishes no answer; it might have been a
poor widow instead.'"
The Martel case is often contrasted with the decision of the
Texas Commission of Appeals in Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Kishi,4" in which the owner of the mineral interest
was awarded damages equal to the full value of the interest
as it was prior to the trespass and disclosure of non-productivity. It has been argued that the contrary results of the
Martel and Kishi cases can be explained by factual differences. There was some evidence that Kishi could have
leased the land for $1,000 an acre, while Martel could not
show that there was any interest in his lease. Also, there
was a producing well in close proximity to Kishi's land,
though not so for Martel's lease. 4 '
Professors Williams and Meyers are critical of both
decisions,45 Kishi because of the existence of liability without regard to the landowner's opportunity to realize upon
the speculative value of the land; Martel because recovery
is denied for the taking, without payment, of a privilege for
which oil operators are often willing to pay large sums,
i.e., the privilege of finding out for themselves whether the
land is productive. It has been suggested that Martel notwithstanding, a Wyoming court might allow recovery of
damages for trespass upon sufficient proof, as where it
could be shown that the owner of the interest in oil and gas
had a bona fide offer withdrawn because of the trespasser's
acts." Whatever the status of Wyoming law in this regard,
the fact that no reported cases since Martel have turned on
the issue there involved suggests that the problem has little
lasting importance.
42. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. at 866.
43. 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Corn. App. 1925); 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Com. App. 1927),
on later appeal, 299 S.W. 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (error ref'd).
44. Note, Another Look at the Martel Caeo, 11 WYo. L.J. 109, 110 (1957).
45. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS; supra note 2, § 229.
46. Note, supra note 44, at 113.
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Some of the problems involved in protection of interests
in oil and gas arise as a consequence of the possibility of
severing the mineral estate from the surface estate. Severance doctrine was first recognized in the case of State ex
rel. Cross v. Board of Land Comm'rs. In that case, the court
held that the Board of Land Commissioners had the authority
to require that the mineral estate be conveyed to the state
before patent would issue to the surface."' The doctrine was
more fully developed in the case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming
Agency.48 Quoting from that opinion: "After severance, the
two estates, owned separately, are held by separate and
distinct titles ... the two estates are 'as distinct as if they
constituted two different parcels of land' . . . 'Each estate
may be occupied, conveyed, incumbered, sold by the sheriff,
or alloted in partition, without any effect upon the other.' ,..
The Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency case illustrates
one effect of severance doctrine on the protection of interests
in oil and gas. In that case, the defendant claimed title to
the mineral estate by adverse possession of the surface estate.
In rejecting that claim, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated
that "(t) he authorities are unanimous in holding that where
the surface and mineral estates have been severed, possession
of the surface by its owner, cannot be adverse to the owner
of the minerals, and that there can be no adverse possession
of the severed mineral estate in the absence of mining
operations.""
The rights of the owner of an interest in oil and gas
are also affected by severance doctrine in the situation where
the owner of the surface estate seeks to recover from the
owner of the mineral estate for surface damages. The issue
is of some importance in Wyoming, where stockraisers own
thousands of surface acres, the federal government having
reserved the rights to any oil and gas in the original patent."
Any development of the underlying minerals necessitates
some use of and damage to the surface estate.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Su ra note 7, at 428-31.
63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947).
Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 179 P.2d at 788.
Id. at 779.
Note, Surface Damage Under a Federal Oil and Gas Lease, 11 Wyo. L.J.
116 (1957).
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The respective rights of the owners of the surface and
mineral estates were adjudicated in the early case of KinneyCoastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer,"2 which arose in the-United States
District Court for Wyoming and whose decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
In that case, an oil and gas lessee sought to enjoin the
owner of the surface estate from establishing a townsite in
an area where one well had obtained production, and further
development would require much of the surface. In granting
the injunction, the Supreme Court held that the mineral
estate had a statutory servitude on the surface estate to
permit extraction of the oil and gas, which would be defeated
by the establishment of a townsite thereon. The Court also
stated that, in the absence of proof of negligent mining
operations, surface owners can recover only for damages
to agricultural improvements or agricultural crops."
The latter part of the Kieffer holding proved significant
in the case of Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co.54 There the
plaintiff, owner of the surface, sought, among other things,
to recover for damage to natural grazing grasses caused by
defendant's drilling operations. The Wyoming Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's denial of compensation on the
ground that natural grasses are not "crops" as that word
had been defined in Kieffer. Since defendant's use of the
surface for drilling installations and the construction of
dwelling house was "reasonably incident" to removal of oil
and gas, the plaintiff's various claims were not valid under
the federal statutes there involved."
52. 277 U.S. 488 (1928).
53. Id. at 505. This was an interpretation of the Agricultural Entry Act of
1914, which provided that the surface owner was entitled to recover damages for injury to "crops"; the Court's holding defined "crops" as those of
agricultural nature. Id.
54. 73 Wyo. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).
55. Id. at 803, 805-06.
The courts have determined numerous acts by the lessee as being
reasonably incident to oil and gas operations. Use of the surface for
drill sites, sumps, tanks, roads, pipe lines, water lines and the use of
heavy machinery are but a few of the many operations conducted by
the lessee causing extensive surface damage for which the stockraiser
is not compensated.
Note, supra note 51, at 117. See also Thompson, Surface Damages-Claims
By Surface Estate Owner Against Mineral Estate Owner, 14 Wyo. L.J. 99
(1960); Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Estate, 5 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 49 (1970).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss2/3

12

Gifford: The Law of Oil and Gas in Wyoming: An Overview

1982

OIL AND GAS IN WYOMING

413

Previous sections of this paper have dealt largely with
the few areas of oil and gas law that have been fairly well
developed by the Wyoming courts. This overview would not
be complete without some mention of a number of related
issues for which there is little or no clear authority found
in the reported decisions of the courts of that state.
One such area is the status of implied covenants in oil
and gas leases in Wyoming. The existence of implied covenants has been the subject of a substantial amount of litigation in other jurisdictions, where courts are forced to
determine the nature of the lessee's duties in connection
with exploration, development and operation, absent a stipulation in the lease itself." However, no opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court has ever turned on the question whether
covenants could be implied in a lease." The reason for the
lack of case law in this area is not clear. At one time there
existed a statutory bar to implied covenants in any conveyance of real estate,"8 but that possible barrier has since
been removed. It has been suggested that the widespread
acceptance of implied covenants in other states has caused
potential litigants to assume their existence in Wyoming law.
Another area in which the development of law in Wyoming has trailed other states is the construction of ambiguous language in instruments granting or reserving interests
in oil and gas. For example, an extremely important issue
arises when such a conveyance uses the word "minerals"
only, with no mention of oil and gas specifically. Surprisingly, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not had to decide
whether the term "minerals" includes oil and gas for such
purposes. The problem was finally dealt with in 1978 by
the United States District Court for the District of Wyo56. Covenants frequently implied in other jurisdictions include the implied
covenant to protect from drainage and the implied covenant of reasonable
development. See generally 5 H. WILLIAMs & C. MEYERS, supra note 2, ch. 8.
57. A few Wyoming cases contain scattered references to implied covenants,
but their existence (or non-existence) was not essential to the holdings
therein. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41, 95 P. 846 (1908);
Pryor Mountain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 222 P. 570 (1924).
See also, Cooper v. Ohio Oil Co., 108 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1939).
58. Note, A Possible Bar to Implied Covenants in Wyoming Oil and Gas Leases,
11 WYo. L.J. 57 (1956).
59. Note, supra note 10, at 85 n.37.
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ming in Amoco Production Co. v. Guild Trust.60 That case
involved a 1909 deed which reserved to the grantor "[a]ll
coal and other minerals within or underlying said lands"
and associated rights of entry and surface use.6 ' The court's
opinion noted that "(a) Ithough the Supreme Court of Wyoming has not ruled on this type of reservation, many state
and federal courts have. The great weight of authority
establishes that this language unambiguously includes oil
and gas and is effective to sever the entire mineral estate."62
On appeal, the District Court's holding was affirmed, the
Circuit Court expressly adopting the analysis of the trial
court. "

There are many other areas-the deed-lease distinction,
double fraction problems, and allocation of production expenses, to name a few-in which Wyoming law is, at best,
partially developed. Suffice it to say that, whatever the
reasons, a large part of the law of oil and gas in Wyoming
remains an open book.
III. SPACING, POOLING AND UNITIZATION

Not surprisingly, the focus of oil and gas law has shifted
in recent years to efforts to conserve those resources. Effective conservation entails a sometimes difficult balancing
of opposing interests. Occupying one side of the scale is the
interest of the state in maximizing recovery of natural resources through avoidance of wasteful practices. Taken to
an extreme, maximum efficiency would demand the development of a whole common source of supply without regard
to surface boundaries of overlying tracts. Countervailing the
state's interest in conservation are the interests of the many
mineral owners in a particular pool to "capture" their fair
share of any oil and gas therein before it is drained by the
other owners-or, in the jargon of the trade, to assert their
"correlative rights." The ensuing "race to the pumps" is
60. 461 F. Supp. 279 (D. Wyo. 1978).
61. Id. at 280.
62. Id. at 281.

63. Amoco Production Co. v. Guild Trust, 626 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1980); see
also Guild Trust v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp., 475 F. Supp. 726
(D. Wyo. 1979); Union Pacific Land Resources Corp. v. Moench Investment Co., 495 F. Supp. 876 (D. Wyo. 1980).
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extremely wasteful, both in terms of money expended on
unnecessary wells, and in the significant amount of oil and
gas rendered unrecoverable as pressure is lost due to excessive drilling. One writer has stated the dilemma as
follows: "The law recognizes that many parties may have
property interests in a reservoir of oil and gas; but the
petroleum engineers describe such a reservoir as a single
mechanical unit and insist that it can be efficiently developed only as a whole.""4
The Wyoming Legislature has long had a hand in controlling waste of that state's natural resources. One of the
early Wyoming cases to make its way to the United States
Supreme Court involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of a Wyoming statute which outlawed certain wasteful uses
of natural gas. In Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,"' the Court
upheld the state's power to "adjust and preserve" one of
its natural resources. At that early date, authority to make
rules and regulations governing the operation and production of oil and gas in Wyoming was vested in the Commissioner of Public Lands. It was not until 1951 that the state
enacted a comprehensive conservation statute, the Oil and
Gas Conservation Act. With some minor amendments and
major additions, that Act remains in operation to this date.6"
Before discussing the provisions controlling well spacing, pooling and unitization in some detail, it should be
helpful to summarize the various other features of the Act.
The basic mandate of the statute is ambitious indeed: "The
waste of oil and gas or either of them in the state of Wyoming as in this act defined is hereby prohibited."6 " The
definition of "waste" is quite broad, listing physical waste,
inefficient dissipation of reservoir energy, inefficient storing
of oil or gas, and several other improper activities. 8 The
body charged with administration of the Act is the Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission, composed of the Governor,
64. Junger, The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 13 Wyo. L.J. 1, 3

(1953).

65.
66.
67.
68.

254 U.S. 300 (1920).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-5-101 to -104, 30-5-108 to -119 (1977).
Id. § 30-5.102(a).
Id. § 30-5-101(a) (i).
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the Commissioner of Public Lands, the State Geologist, and
two members appointed by the Governor from the public at
large. " Also created is the office of Oil and Gas Supervisor,
who is ex officio the Director and Secretary of the Commission. 0 The Commission is vested with a wide range of
powers, including authority to allocate allowable production,' to require a wide variety of information from producers and to regulate drilling operations;"2 all in addition
to a general power to "make rules, regulations, and orders
... to effectuate the purposes and intent" of the Act.78 The
Commission is specifically empowered to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, and require the production of all types of
records for its hearings."4 Persons who violate the various
provisions of the Act are subject to suit brought by the
Commission," and may be civilly or criminally liable. 6
Section 30-5-117 of the statute, which bears the heading "Construction of act generally", contains the following
limitation on the Commission's authority:
It is not the intent or purpose of this law to require,
permit, or authorize the commission or supervisor
to prorate or distribute the production of oil and
gas among the fields of Wyoming on the basis of
market demand. This act shall never be construed
to require, permit or authorize the commission,
the supervisor, or any court to make, enter or enforce any order, rule, regulation or judgment requiring restriction of production of any pool or of
any well except to prevent waste and to protect
correlative rights."
In the original 1951 version of what is now Section 30-5-117,
that second sentence read much differently: "This act shall
never be construed to require, permit or authorize the
Commission . . . to make . . . any order . . . requiring
restriction of production of any pool or of any well . . .
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. § 30-5-103(a).
Id. § 30-5-103(d).
Id. § 30-5-102(b).
Id. § 30-5-104(d).
Id. § 30-5-104(c).
Id. § 30-5-112.
Id. § 30-5-114.
Id. § 30-5-119.
Id. § 30-5-117.
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to an amount less than the well or pool can produce in
accordance with sound engineering practice. '7 8 It has been
argued that the original wording of that section contradicted the intent of the Act, since some types of waste
(e.g., the flaring of gas) can be committed even though the
well itself violates no practice of good engineering. 9 A
1971 amendment removed the inconsistency and brought
the section to its present form.
As originally enacted, the conservation statute was
also criticized for not giving the Commission the power to
protect the correlative rights of owners over a common
pool.80 The Act was amended in 1971 to provide that
"[w]hen required, to protect correlative rights . . . the
commission . . . shall have the power to establish drilling
units of specified and approximately uniform size covering
any pool."'" Section 30-5-102 of the Act, as amended, defines "correlative rights" as "the opportunity afforded the
owner of each property in a pool to produce, so far as it is
reasonably practicable to do so without waste, his just and
equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool.""2
78. 1951 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 94, § 14 (emphasis added).
79. Junger, supra note 64, at 7. Interestingly, the hypothetical chosen by the
author of that article to illustrate a potential problem with the original
wording of the statute was actually litigated in the case of Inexco Oil Co.
v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 490 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1971). In that
case, Inexco was involved in the flaring of gas which could not be economically saved and used at the time it was produced. The Commission cut
back on Inexco's allowable production in an effort to curtail consumption of
the gas in that manner. The sole issue before the Supreme Court of Wyoming was whether the Commission had authority to restrict production
from Inexco's oil wells under those circumstances. That the operation of
the wells themselves was in accordance with sound engineering practices
was not contested by the Commission. Inexco pointed out that the definition
of waste in effect at that time specifically excluded flaring of gas unavoidably produced with oil if it is not economically feasible for the producer to save or use such gas. In a somewhat confused opinion, the court
upheld the Commission's actions, reading the 1971 amendment (which was
passed during the course of the litigation) as making it clear that "in
order to prevent waste conservation measures were permissible." 490 P.2d
at 1068.
80. Junger, eupra note 64, at 42.
81. WYO. STAT. § 30-5-109(a) (1977).
82. The argument has been made that the provision that the Commission must
protect correlative rights imposes no greater obligation than had previously
existed at common law. Jones, Protection of Correlative Rights in Wyoming,
3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 363, 375 (1968).
Correlative rights exist as common law rights against (1) the waste
of extracted substances, (2) spoilage of the common reservoir, (3)
malicious depletion of the common source of supply, and (4) as the
right to extract a fair share of the oil or gas. Any abridgement of
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A. Well Spacing
The well spacing provisions of the Wyoming Oil and
Gas Conservation Act are based on the premise that it only
takes one oil well to efficiently drain a certain area. In the
previously cited section authorizing the Commission to establish drilling units, a later provision demands that "(i)n
establishing a drilling unit, the acreage to be embraced
within each unit and the shape thereof . . . shall not be
smaller than the maximum area that can be efficiently
drained by one (1) well." 8 Those directives are implemented
roughly as follows :84
In the usual case, there are a variety of ownership
interests in a given pool, ranging from parties working
under an operating agreement to owners of the mineral
estate in fee. When an operator discovers a new source of
oil or gas, he immediately applies to the Commission for
a spacing order. In that initial application, the operator
must express his best estimate of the areal limits of the
pool. Following the application, a spacing hearing is held
by the Commission, at which time the other overlying owners
may, and frequently do, contest the application. A common
issue is the selection of the appropriate spacing pattern
for the particular field-80 acre- v. 160-acre spacing; 320
acre- v. 640-acre spacing, etc. Expert testimony is heard
from all sides. Within thirty days after the hearing a spacing
order is issued by the Commission, and development of the
new field can proceed.
Usually, the Commission's initial spacing order is temporary. As development of the new field reveals more
definitely the extent of the pool, the Commission may
reconvene to review its previous spacing order. As a result
of that second hearing, the size of the spaced area may be
reduced.
these rights by the legislature amounts to a taking of private property
for which compensation must be paid.
Id.
83. Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-109(b) (1977).
84. See generally Williams & Porter, Practice Before the Wyoming Oil and
Gas ConservationCommission, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 353, 368-75 (1975).
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As has been discussed, the interest of the Commission
in avoiding waste of oil and gas through efficient spacing
may clash with the interests of the overlying owners in
asserting their correlative rights. For example, it may be
that the location of a well at the spot mandated by the
spacing order would yield a dry hole; but if the owner were
allowed to drill elsewhere on his tract production would be
obtained. The Commission has attempted to provide for a
proper balancing of those interests through the adoption
of two rules. Rule 302 requires oil and gas wells to be
located in the center of a 40-acre parcel; subject, of course,
to the Commission's prerogative to opt for larger or smaller
drilling units, where appropriate. Rule 303 authorizes applications for an exception to the restrictions of Rule 302.85
"[That] provision for an exception, while not expressly
mentioning correlative rights, is involved in a correlative
rights question . . . [I]f the only way a lessor or lessee may
recover the oil underneath a given tract is to allow a well
to be drilled, then the Commission is authorized to grant
such an exception to a spacing order....""
The propriety of Commission practices in applying
Rules 302 and 303 was at issue in the case of Pan American
Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm'n."7 Pan American had applied for an exception to
the Commission's spacing rules. That application was successfully challenged by Marathon Oil Company; the Commission held that the granting of an exception was not
necessary to protect Pan American's correlative rights, since
Pan American's existing wells would adequately drain the
oil in their tract. Pan American alleged that since the field,
of which its tract was part, had been substantially developed prior to the enactment of the conservation statute,
that Act and the operational rules thereunder should not
apply. The constitutionality of applying Rule 302 retroactively was also challenged. The Wyoming Supreme Court
85. Rules 302 and 303 of the Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming Oil and
Gas Comm'n represent the Commission's efforts to implement two parts of
the statute: Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-109(b), (c) (1977).
86. Williams & Porter, supra note 84, at 374.
87. 446 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1968).
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did not pass on Pan American's allegations, but returned
the entire matter to the Commission for reconsideration,
stating:
. . . [W]e think those matters [relating to the
constitutionality of Rule 302] must be deferred
for the reason that we find it necessary to return
this proceeding to the commission for further consideration of the factual issues tendered pursuant
to Rule 303 which in substance is an "escape
hatch" to claimed infringement of property rights
by Rule 302. Until the commission disposes of
these matters in keeping with the directions of this
court .. . any effort now to pass upon the foregoing claimed errors would be premature. Counsel,
we are sure, are well aware of the fundamental
rule that courts do not pass upon constitutionality
of statutes unless the necessity therefore clearly
appears8
Two years later, the names had changed but the problems remained. In Marathon Oil Co. v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp.,89 the Commission had, on rehearing, adhered to its position that Rule 302 was controlling and
again denied Pan American's application for exception to
the spacing provisions. The district court reversed that
decision, holding Rule 302 invalid as applied to the particular field in question. In upholding the determination of
the district court, the Supreme Court of Wyoming added:
"The Commission's Rule 302 utterly and completely disregards the circumstances present in a field which was
developed prior to the adoption of such rule, where wells
were not drilled at the center of 40-acre subdivisions of
land. If it were not for Rule 303, it would be unreasonable
and arbitrary for the Commission to apply Rule 302 to
[such a field]." 9 The court concluded that the Commission
had not made findings of fact sufficient to justify its denial
of Pan American's application for an exception.
More recently, in Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation
Comm'n. 1 the Commission's action in ordering 80-acre
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 554.
473 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1970).
Id. at 577.
569 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 1977).
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spacing in a field was challenged, where there was substantial evidence that plaintiff's well was already efficiently
draining a much larger area. The Wyoming Supreme Court
observed that under the statute, before a drilling unit can
be established, the Commission must first find that such
a unit is necessary to protect correlative rights or to prevent waste. 2 Once that determination is made, the Commission must decide on the size of the unit, but each unit
"shall not be smaller than the maximum area that can be
efficiently drained by one (1) well.""5 The court noted that
the Commission's findings of fact in the case made absolutely
no mention of plaintiff's correlative rights, nor was the
amount of oil that could be recovered without waste indicated. The case was remanded for further findings of fact
with the directive that, in order to determine the extent
of the correlative rights in question, the Commission must
establish ("insofar as it is reasonably practicable to do so")
the following: (1) the amount of recoverable oil in the pool;
(2) the amount of recoverable oil under the various tracts;
(3) the proportion that #1 bears to #2; and
(4) the amount
94
of oil that can be recovered without waste.
In dicta, the court criticized the Commission's misinterpretation of certain legal standards. Specifically, the
court found fault with the wording of one of the Commission's "conclusions of law" in the case, which stated that
the drilling of additional wells in a certain pool would constitute "economic and physical" waste. The court pointed
out that "economic" waste was not among the types of waste
embraced by the statute; that, indeed, the legislature had
considered and rejected language which would have brought
"the drilling of wells not reasonably necessary to effect an
economic maximum ultimate recovery of oil and gas from
92. Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-109 (a) (1977) provides:
When required, to protect correlative rights or, to prevent or to assist
in preventing any of the various types of waste of oil or gas prohibited
by this act, or by any statute of this state, the commission, upon its
own motion or on a proper application of an interested party, but after
notice and hearing as herein provided shall have the power to establish
drilling units of specified and approximately uniform size covering any
pool.
93. Id. § 30-5-109(b).
94. Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, suprm note 91, at 92.
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a pool" within the definition of waste. The court warned
the Commission that "[in making] an ultimate finding
concerning waste, in this and similar considerations, it
should do so only on the basis of the various types of waste
enumerated in [the statute]."" That statement appears to
directly contradict the court's previous holding in the Inexco
6
case.
The Larsen case has engendered a good deal of controversy among oil and gas practitioners. It has been suggested
that given limits of the technical capacity of the oil and gas
industry to estimate, with any degree of confidence, the
amount of recoverable oil or gas underlying any portion of
a given reservoir, the holding in Larsen imposes on well
spacing applicants a burden of proof which they are incapable of sustaining." Moreover, it appears that the Larsen
holding is based upon a New Mexico case, Continental Oil
Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n.,"8 which involved the
application of a New Mexico conservation law authorizing
the establishment of market demand proration units, even
though Wyoming conservation law explicitly prohibits limiting production on the basis of market demand." Finally,
it should be noted that following the court's holding in
Larsen, the Wyoming legislature amended the statutory
powers conferred upon the Commission to include authority
to establish drilling units affording each owner "an opportunity to drill for and produce as a prudent operator, and
so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so without waste,
his just and equitable share of the oil or gas or both in the
pool. . . ."00 (Emphasis supplied). The effect of the new
language should be to allow the Commission to act with an
eye toward the economic and technical limitations imposed
upon the oil and gas industry.
95. Id. at 93.
96. See supra note 79.
97. Newman, PracticeBefore State Oil and Gas Agencies, 1981 NAT. RESOURCES
AD. L. & PROC. INST. 38.
98. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
99. Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-117 (1977).
100. Id. § 30-5-104(d) (iv) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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B. Pooling
Once a spacing order is entered by the Commission,
and depending upon the size of the drilling unit chosen,
there may exist individual tracts which are too small to
qualify for a well under the terms of the order. To bar the
owner of such a tract from extracting the oil and gas under
his land would constitute a denial of his correlative rights.
On the other hand, the tract may be so small that the cost
of drilling a well exceeds the value of the underlying resources. Pooling statutes are designed to solve that dilemma
by combining the smaller tracts into an area large enough
to justify the drilling of a well, with costs and benefits of
the operation to be apportioned among the pooled interests.
The Oil and Gas Conservation Act provides for pooling
(also referred to as communitization) both on a voluntary
basis, and by order of the Commission if a voluntary agreement cannot be reached. A pooling order can be made only
after notice and hearing, and must be upon terms and conditions that are "just and reasonable."''
In the easiest case, the owners of oil and gas interests
in the various smaller tracts enter into a pooling agreement.
Details such as the location of the well, the costs to be borne
by each of the parties and the allocation of any oil and gas
produced are worked out by the interested parties themselves. Drilling can then proceed in accordance with the
spacing order.
The harder case arises when one or more of the owners
of mineral interests in the drilling unit refuses to enter into
a pooling agreement voluntarily. In such a case, upon the
application of any interested person, the Commission may
enter an order pooling all interests in the drilling unit. The
statute provides a substantial incentive for voluntary agreements, as nonconsenting owners pay a heavy penalty for
their refusal to coalesce. The penalty is built into the section
of the Act which empowers the Commission to apportion
drilling and operating costs among the parties covered by
the pooling order. That section provides that nonconsenting
101. Wyo. STAT. § 30-5-109(f) (1977).
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owners may be charged for two hundred percent of certain
costs associated with the well, to be deducted from such
nonconsenting owners' share of production.' A potential
party to a pooling agreement is thus faced with a choice.
If he chooses to enter the agreement voluntarily, he will
undoubtedly have to contribute to the costs of drilling the
well out of pocket. If he chooses to withhold his consent he
escapes the out-of-pocket expenses, but risks having to pay
twice his share of certain costs out of production, should
the Commission enter a pooling order. Of the many variables
which may figure in that decision, probably the most important is the likelihood of the presence of oil or gas beneath
the drilling unit.
The mandatory two hundred percent nonconsent penalty
has been subject to some criticism. Under the terms of the
Wyoming statute, no discretion is given to the Commission
to vary the penalty from case to case. Professors Williams
and Meyers have expressed a "lack of enthusiasm for a rule
that says, in every case, without regard to the degree of
risk, the price of refusal to share in drilling costs at the
outset is 200 per cent of those costs if the well comes in."1 3
The professors would prefer a rule giving the Commission
discretion to adjust the amount of the penalty according to
the facts of the case, subject to a two hundred percent
ceiling.
There is surprisingly little case law dealing with the
pooling statute. In Mitchell v. Simpson,"' The only issue
was jurisdiction. The Commission had entered an order for
pooling of the tracts in a certain drilling unit; the nonconsenting party, Simpson, was the owner of a royalty
interest in one of those tracts. The trial court had granted
102. Id. § 30-5-109 (g) (ii).

Two hundred percent (200%) of that portion of the costs and expenses
of drilling, reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing and completing, after deducting any cash contributions received and two hundred percent (200%) of that portion of the cost of newly acquired
equipment in the well (to and including the wellhead connections),
which would have been chargeable to such nonconsenting owner if it
had participated therein.

ld.
103. Williams & Meyers, Petroleum Conservation in Oh1io, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 591,
611 (1965).
104. 493 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1972).
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Simpson's motion for summary judgment, holding that
royalty owners are not within the Commission's jurisdiction
for pooling purposes. The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed that holding, quoting the language of the statute that
"[i]n the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission, upon
the application of any interested person, may enter an order
pooling all interests in the drilling unit for development
and operation thereof."'' 5 (Emphasis in original). Furthermore, the court referred to another section of the statutes
which gives the Commission "jurisdiction and authority over
all persons and property, public and private, necessary to
effectuate the purposes and intent of this act."' 6 The supreme court found, in the above quoted language, ample
support for the Commission's claim of jurisdiction over
royalty owners. By this writer's research, Mitchell v. Simpson is the only reported case dealing with Wyoming's pooling
provision to date.
C. Unitization
As previously discussed, the concern of Wyoming's pooling provision is to reconcile the objectives of well spacing
with the special problems of small tract owners. Ideally,
the pooling provision allows for the efficient development
of a new field, while protecting the correlative rights of the
overlying owners.
That is not to say that optimal well spacing will necessarily result in maximum recovery of oil and gas from a
given pool. To achieve that goal, other activities may be
necessary, such as pressure maintenance and secondary recovery operations. To be effective, those activities will often
require unitary operation of the field. °7 In some cases, there
may be nonconsenting owners, so that a voluntary unitization agreement is impossible. In response to such a situation,
many states have enacted statutes providing for "compulsory" unitization; "compulsory" only in the sense that if a
105. Id. at 402 (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
107. It is important to distinguish between "pooling" and "unitization". Pooling
involves the comminitization of small tract owners to yield the areal equivalent of a drilling unit; unitization is the communitization of all interests
in a given pool.
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super majority of the interests in a field favor unitization,
the state commission is empowered to override the objections
of the nonconsenting minority.
The Wyoming provision is typical in that regard. To
be effective, a plan of unitization must be approved by the
owners of at least eighty percent of the cost-bearing interests
and by the owners of a like percentage of any cost-free
interests. ' Commission procedure in entering a compulsory
unitization order is much the same as for well spacing. Any
interested person may apply for an order compelling unitization. The application must provide a variety of information,
including a description of the pool, the names of persons
owning interests therein, and "a statement of the type of
operations contemplated in order to effectuate the purposes
of this act.'. Following the application, the Commission
must hold a hearing, with adequate notice. In order to justify
a plan for unitization, evidence gathered at the hearing
must substantiate the following findings:
(1) Unit operation is feasible, will prevent waste,
will protect correlative rights, and can reasonably be expected to increase substantially the
ultimate recovery of oil or gas.
(2) The value of the estimated additional recovery
of oil or gas will exceed the estimated additional costs of unit operations.
(3) The unit plan will allocate a just and reasonable share of the oil or gas produced to each
separately owned tract.
(4) The unit plan allocates costs of unit operations
to the various owners in a manner which is
fair and equitable."'
108. WYo. STAT. § 30-5-110(f) (1977).
109. Id. § 30-5-110(c). Permissible operations are listed at § 30-5-110(a) as
follows:
waterflooding or other recovery operations involving the introduction
of extraneous forms of energy into any pool, repressuring or pressure
maintenance operations, cycling or recycling operations, including the
extraction and separation of. liquid hydrocarbons from natural gas in
connection therewith, or for carrying any other method of unit or
cooperative development or operation of one (1) or more pools or parts

thereof....

110. Id. § 30-5-110(e) . For a detailed analysis of the various sections of the
unitization statute, see Gray & Swan, Fieldwide Unitization in Wyoming,
7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 433 (1972).
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If evidence adduced at the hearing is sufficient to justify
those findings, and provided that the requisite eighty percent approval from interest owners has been received, the
Commission is empowered to order unitization as requested."1
As a practical matter, the need for a compulsory unitization statute in Wyoming appears to be marginal. Although
such provisions were enacted in several of the oil and gasproducing states during the 1950's, the Wyoming Legislature did not see fit to adopt such a statute until 1971. Since
that time, no reported case has dealt directly with the various
sections of the Wyoming statute. The main reason for the
lack of litigation in the area is probably the fact that virtually all owners recognize unit agreements as being in their
own best interests. Little compulsion is needed where, as in
Wyoming, "companies have uniformly taken the position
that all interest owners should voluntarily execute unit
agreements.....

111. In 1980, the Wyoming legislature amended the applicable statute to provide
that the Commission may reduce the required percentage of approval from
80% to 75%, in situations where the applicant has participated in negotiations "diligently and in good faith" for a period of at least nine months
prior to the filing of the application. WYo. STAT. § 30-5-110(f) (Supp.
1981).
112. Williams & Porter, supra note 84, at 394.
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